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Abstract—This paper presents the closed-form expression for
a circular array, of the spatial security outage probability which
is a novel performance metric that measures the security level of
the legitimate transmission from the spatial aspect in the presence
of Poisson Point Process distributed eavesdroppers. In this paper,
it is shown how beamforming is used to create an exposure
region where any randomly located eavesdropper causes secrecy
outage, based on which the general expression of the spatial
security outage probability is derived. Using this, the closed-form
expression is obtained for the circular array, which reveals the
impact of the array parameters on the security performance.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the ubiquitous utility of wireless communications,
the need to develop higher level security has grown stronger.
Physical layer security has recently received much attention
as a complementary approach to the traditional encryption
techniques in the higher layers [1]. Much research has been
based on Wyner’s wiretap channel model [2] and has been
extended to various channel models (see [3] and references
therein). However, the large-scale path loss has not been
considered to any great extent as users are often randomly
distributed, and it has only been with recent developments
in stochastic geometry theory, e.g., via Poisson point process
(PPP) [4], [5], that the distribution of the random users’
locations can be modeled.
Users’ locations provide an intrinsic distinction for the
related channels because the large-scale path loss is related to
users’ distances to the transmitter. In Wyner’s wiretap channel
model, the legitimate user should have a better channel than
the eavesdropper. Therefore, the user’s location should be taken
into account when considering a secure transmission for the
legitimate user in presence of eavesdroppers. In this paper,
we consider the classic model of Alice, Bob and Eve(s) and
the scenarios that only Bob’s location information is available
at Alice, as explained in [6]. Alice is equipped with uniform
circular array (UCA) and wishes to transmit to Bob in presence
of PPP distributed Eves. Bob and Eves are assumed to have
a single antenna, and beamforming based on Bob’s location
information is performed to create the exposure region (ER)
where any Eve inside causes secrecy outage to the legitimate
transmission.
There has been work that considers the physical region
related to secure transmissions [5]–[9]. However, in [7],
the physical region is not based on the information-theoretic
parameters, thus is not subject to formal analysis. In [5],
[6], [8], [9], the physical region is based on the secrecy
outage probability, but array parameters are overlooked. Since
beamforming is performed via antenna arrays, the ER created
by using beamforming is highly related to the array parameters
and can be controlled by changing the array parameters.
In this paper, the ER-based beamforming is introduced
for the first time to introduce physical layer security from
the spatial aspect. To this end, a novel performance metric,
i.e., the spatial secrecy outage probability (SSOP), is derived
to measure the security level of the legitimate transmission.
This allows analysis of the impact of the array parameters on
the security performance. To begin with, a free-space channel
model is used as a guidance for fading channels as well. The
SSOP can be applied to conduct information-theoretic analysis
for previous work [7] and can extend the work in [5], [8], [9]
by analyzing the security performance with respect to the array
parameters. The main contributions of the paper are:
• Establishment of the concept of the ER based on the
secrecy outage probability and development of the
SSOP to measure the physical layer security level for
the free-space channel for the first time;
• Derivation of the closed-form relationship between the
SSOP and UCA parameters, i.e., number of elements
and radius;
• Analysis of the impact of the array parameters.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the system
and channel models are introduced. In Section III-A, the ER
and the SSOP for a general array are introduced and followed
by the derivation of the closed-form expression of the SSOP
for a UCA. In Section IV, the impact of the array parameters
is analyzed and followed by the conclusions in Section V.
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Fig. 1. An example of a wireless security communications system with one
AP, i.e., Alice, Bob and homogeneous PPP distributed Eves
II. SYSTEM AND CHANNEL MODELS
Consider secure communications in a wireless local access
network, where the access point (AP), Alice, communicates to
a desired receiver (Bob) in presence of passive eavesdroppers
(Eves), as shown in Fig. 1. Let’s suppose that the AP is
equipped with a UCA having N antenna elements with radius
R, where λ is the wavelength of the carrier signal [10]. Bob
and Eves are assumed to have a single antenna and are simply
referred to as a ‘general user’ or a ‘user’ hereinafter, unless
otherwise stated.
We consider that the AP is located at the origin point,
as shown in Fig. 1. Assume that the users are distributed
by a homogeneous PPP, Φe, with density λe [4]; the user’s
coordinates are denoted by z = (d, θ). Thus, Bob’s coordinates
are denoted by zB = (dB , θB); the ith Eve’s coordinate is
zEi = (dEi, θEi),∀i ∈ N+. The subscripts ‘B’ and ‘E’ are
used for Bob and Eves hereinafter.
Given zB , the AP transmits data only towards Bob in the
presence of l randomly distributed Eves in every transmit time
interval. In particular, let x be the modulated symbol with unit
power, E[|x|2] = 1, and Pt be its transmit power. The trans-
mitted vector, denoted by u, is given by u =
√
Ptw
∗x, where
w is the beamforming weight vector, i.e., w = s(θ)/
√
N , and
s(θ) is the array steering vector for the UCA,
s(θ) = [1, ..., e−jkR cos(θ−ψi), ..., e−jkR cos(θ−ψN )]T , (1)
where θ ∈ [0, 2pi], ψi = 2pi(i− 1)/N and k = 2pi/λ, and λ is
the wavelength of the carrier signal, which for the 2.4 GHz Wi-
Fi signal is 12.5 cm. When θ is set to θB , i.e., w = s(θB)/
√
N ,
the received power at Bob is maximized.
For a general user at z = (d, θ), denoted by h(z), the
channel gain vector between the AP and user at z can be
expressed by
h(z) = d−1s(θ), (2)
where d−1 denotes the free-space path loss at the distance d.
According to (2), the received signal at z can be obtained by
r(z) = hT (z)u + nW =
√
Pt
d
G(θ, θB)x+ nW , (3)
where nW is the additive white Gaussian noise with zero mean
and variance σ2n and G(θ, θB) is the array factor and is given
by
G(θ, θB) =
1√
N
N∑
i=1
ejkR[cos(θB−ψi)−cos(θ−ψi)]. (4)
Denoted by γ(z), the received SNR at z, can be found
from (3),
γ(z) =
PtG
2(θ, θB)
σ2nd
2
. (5)
The channel capacity of the general user at z can be given by
C(z) = log2[1 + γ(z)] = log2
[
1 +
PtG
2(θ, θB)
σ2nd
2
]
. (6)
For convenience, let CB = C(zB) and CEi = C(zEi) denote
the channel capacities of Bob and the i-th Eve hereinafter. A
proper design of G(θ, θB) can improve CB while decreasing
CEi.
III. EXPOSURE REGION AND SPATIAL SECRECY OUTAGE
PROBABILITY
From (6), it can be noticed that CEi relies on a random
location zEi. As a result, one or more Eves could have a higher
channel capacity than a certain threshold, leading to the secrecy
outage [11]. For given Eves’ random locations, the exposure
region (ER) is mathematically formulated to characterize the
above secrecy outage event. Then the SSOP with respect to
the ER is evaluated as a measure of the security level.
A. Exposure Region
Let RB and Rs be the rate of the transmitted codewords
and the rate of the confidential information, respectively, As
in [11], we differentiate a secrecy outage and a unreliable
transmission, i.e., a data outage when CB < RB . In this paper,
we only focus on a secrecy outage event, given that CB ≥ RB .
Notice that the data outage event, given that CB < RB , is the
typical outage with no secrecy and thus no secrecy outage.
Accordingly, this data outage is not part of the secrecy outage
and is out of our scope. Secrecy outage event occurs when
Eve’s channel capacity is higher than the difference RB −Rs
conditioned on CB ≥ RB , and the probability of such an event
is the SOP.
A geometric relationship is lacking in the above definition
of SOP in [11]. To characterize the secrecy outage event for
the PPP distributed Eves, the ER, denoted by Θ, is defined by
the geometric region only where Eves cause the secrecy outage
event, i.e., CEi > RB −Rs,∃zEi = (d, θ) ∈ Θ. Accordingly,
Θ can be represented by
Θ = {z : C(z) > RB −Rs}. (7)
The ith Eve will cause secrecy outage, if and only if zEi ∈ Θ.
At the same time, CB ≥ RB needs to be guaranteed.
Substituting (6) into (7) and rearranging d and θ, Θ can be
transformed into
Θ = {z = (d, θ) : d < D(θ)}, (8)
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Fig. 2. Illustration of the ER Θ. D(θ) is the contour of Θ for given θB ,
which corresponds to C(z) = RB − Rs; Bob should be within the curve
C(z) = RB to guarantee a reliable transmission.
where
D(θ) = [c0G
2(θ, θB)]
1
2 , (9)
where the constant c0 = Ptσ2n(2RB−RS−1) . D(θ) is a function
only of θ for a given θB and the contour of Θ.
All locations within D(θ) have C(z) > RB−Rs, giving a
clear geometric meaning, as shown in Fig. 2. It can be shown
from (9) that D(θ) (i.e., the shape of Θ) is mainly determined
by G(θ, θB).
Denoted by A, the quantity of Θ can be measured by the
inner area of D(θ). Using (9), A in polar coordinates can be
expressed by,
A =
1
2
∫ 2pi
0
D2(θ) dθ =
c0
2
∫ 2pi
0
G2(θ, θB) dθ. (10)
A is measured in m2 and depends on G(θ, θB). Note that A is
a general expression for any type of array.
A reliable transmission is guaranteed for Bob, if Bob is
inside the dashed curve in Fig. 2, i.e., CB > RB . A secrecy
outage event only occurs when zEi ∈ Θ. Intuitively, given that
Bob’s reliable transmission is guaranteed, the smaller A is, the
smaller number of Eves are statistically located in Θ, leading
to less occurrence of the secrecy outage.
B. Spatial Secrecy Outage Probability
Any Eve at zEi ∈ Θ causes CEi > RB − Rs and
this is referred to as a spatial secrecy outage (SSO) event
with respect to the ER. The SSOP can be defined by the
probability that any Eve is located inside Θ. To the best of
our knowledge, the SSOP provides distinctive measure of the
ER based security over the conventional SOP which does not
have dynamic geometric implication; the SSOP emphasizes the
secrecy outage caused by the spatially distributed Eves within
a dynamic Θ.
We quantify the SSOP, denoted by p, to measure the
secrecy performance. Particularly for given PPP-distributed
Eves, the probability that m Eves are located inside Θ (with
its area quantity A) is given by
Prob{m Eves in Θ} = (λeA)
m
m!
e−λeA. (11)
Using (10) and (11), p can be quantitatively measured by
referring to ‘no secrecy outage’ event that no Eves are located
inside Θ and is given by
p = 1− Prob{0 Eve in Θ} = 1− e−λeA, (12)
where A is given by (10). It can be seen from (12) that for
a given λe, p decreases along with A. The smaller p is, the
less the spatial secrecy outage occurs. This results in the more
secure transmission to Bob.
Remark 1: The probability p in (12) is positively corre-
lated with the transmit power Pt via c0. It is worth noticing
that Pt influences the SSOP being independent of the array
parameters. Therefore, when studying the impact of the array
parameters, Pt is treated as constant within the constant c0.
Note that the expression of p in (12) is a general expression
for any type of array. Given the expression of G(θ, θB) for
arbitrary array, p can be numerically calculated. For the UCA,
the closed-form expression of p can be derived in the following
section to facilitate detailed theoretical analysis.
C. Derivation of Closed-form SSOP for UCA
In order to obtain the closed-form expression of p for a
UCA, the closed-form expression of A should be obtained
first, according to (12). To this end, θ should be first isolated
to solve the integral in (10).
G2(θ, θB) =
1
N
∑
i,j
ejkR[cos(θB−ψi)−cos(θB−ψj)]·
e−jkR[cos(θ−ψi)−cos(θ−ψj)], (13)
where
∑
i,j represents
∑N
i=1
∑N
j=1 and cos(θ−ψi)−cos(θ−
ψj) can be further derived by
cos(θ − ψi)− cos(θ − ψj)
=2 sin(θ − i+ j − 2
N
pi) sin(
i− j
N
pi). (14)
Let Wi,j = 2 sin( i−jN pi) and Zi,j =
i+j−2
N pi. Substituting (14)
into (13), it can be derived that
G2(θ, θB) =
1
N
∑
i,j
ejkRWi,j sin(θB−Zi,j)
· e−jkRWi,j sin(θ−Zi,j). (15)
According to Jn(x) = 12pi
∫ pi
−pi e
j(nτ−x sin τ)dτ , substituting
(15) into (10), A can be derived as
A =
pic0
N
∑
i,j
J0(kRWi,j)e
jkRWi,j sin(θB−Zi,j), (16)
where J0(·) is the Bessel function of the first kind with order
zero. The double summation of J0(·) in (16) is intractable to
analyze. Thus, A will be further simplified in the following.
Let Ai,j denote each summation term in (16), i.e.,
Ai,j =
pic0
N
J0(kRWi,j)e
jkRWi,j sin(θB−Zi,j). (17)
It can be deduced that Wi,j = −Wj,i and Zi,j = Zj,i.
Consider that J0(x) is an even function, it can be deduced
that Ai,j = A∗j,i. Furthermore, it is also noticed that Wi,j+N =
−Wi,j and sin(θB − Zi,j+N ) = − sin(θB − Zi,j). Therefore,
Ai,j = Ai,j+N . As a result, the summation of A in (16)
can be formulated in a new way. To better illustrate the new
summation, an extended table is created, as shown in Fig. 3,
where N = 4. Instead of adding Ai,j along the row and
column, the summation is executed diagonally.
extened table: j > 4
2,  jiZ
N
ji

1n 2n 3n0n
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
0 1 2 31
1 2 3 4 52
2 3 4 5 6 73
3 4 5 6 7 8 94
jin 
j
i
Fig. 3. Table for Zi,j
For convenience, let n = i − j. Then, Wn = Wi,j =
2 sin( nN pi). The terms Ai,j on the red diagonal lines in the table
have the same Wn. In the table, Npi Zi,j is allocated according
to their indice i and j. Given n = i− j, it can be derived that
Zn,i = Zi,j =
i+ j − 2
N
pi =
2i− n− 2
N
pi. (18)
Thus, it can be derived that
An,i = Ai,j =
pic0
N
J0(kRWn)e
jkRWn sin(θB−Zn,i). (19)
Because Ai,j = Ai,j+N , the calculation of A can be
executed by replacing the lower triangle in the original table
(i.e., i > j) with the lower triangle in the extended table
(i.e., i > j − N ). In the new formation of A, which is a
parallelogram table, the summation can be carried out along
the diagonal lines from n = 0 to n = −(N − 1). For any n,
there are N summation terms on the diagonal. Thus, (16) can
be transformed into
A =
pic0
N
−(N−1)∑
n=0
N∑
i=1
J0(kRWn)e
jkRWn sin(θB−Zn,i) (20)
In (20), the exponential can be expanded according to Jacobi-
Anger expansion, i.e.,
ejα sin γ =
∞∑
m=−∞
Jm(α)e
jmγ , (21)
where Jm(·) is the Bessel function of the first kind with order
m. Substituting (18) into (20) and applying (21), (20) can be
further derived by
A =
pic0
N
−(N−1)∑
n=0
∞∑
m=−∞
J0(kRWn)Jm(kRWn)
ejmθBejpi
m
N (n+2)
N∑
i=1
e−j2pi
m
N i. (22)
When m 6= lN ,
N∑
i=1
e−j2pi
m
N i = e−j2pi
m
N
1− e−j2pimNN
1− e−j2pimN = 0. (23)
When m = lN , l ∈ Z, we have
N∑
i=1
e−j2pi
m
N i =
N∑
i=1
e−j2pili = N, (24)
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Fig. 4. Upper plot: JlN (x) for different l, N = 8; lower plot: true value
and the approximation value of A versus N , R = 1.75λ, θB = 0◦.
and
ejpi
m
N (n+2) = ejlnpiej2pil = ejlnpi = (−1)ln. (25)
Substituting (23)-(25) into (22), it can be derived that
A = pic0
−(N−1)∑
n=0
∞∑
l=−∞
(−1)lnJ0(kRWn)JlN (kRWn)ejlNθB
(26)
Applying Jn(−x) = (−1)nJn(x) to (26), the following
expression can be obtained.
A = pic0
N−1∑
n=0
∞∑
l=−∞
(−1)ln+lNJ0(kRWn)JlN (kRWn)ejlNθB .
(27)
Substituting (27) into (12), the closed-form expression of
p is then obtained. Compared to (16), the summation in
(27) consists of a finite summation of J0(·) and an infinite
summation of JlN (·), which can provide asymptotic analysis.
Since p is positively correlated with A, the impact of the array
parameters (N and R) on p can be analyzed via (27).
IV. IMPACT OF ARRAY PARAMETERS ON SSOP
A. Impact of Number of Elements
Examples of JlN (x) are shown by the upper plot in Fig. 4,
where N = 8 and x = KRWn, according to (27). According
to the expression of Wn, the range of x is fixed, i.e., (0, 2kR],
which is independent of N . For R = 1.75λ, 2kR = 7pi. When
l = 0, J0(x) starts with the maximum value, i.e., 1, and has
a damping envelope. When l > 0, J8l(x) starts from zero
and only become comparable to J0(x) for a sufficiently large
value x0(lN) that depends on l > 0 and N . For example,
in the upper plot in Fig. 4, J8(x) is negligible in the range
x ∈ [0, 5] and J16(x) is negligible in the range x ∈ [0, 12]. In
the x ∈ (0, 7pi], J8l(x) with l > 2 is negligible. In general, the
infinite summation of JlN (x) in (27) can be approximated by
a finite summation.
It can also be observed from the upper plot in Fig. 4 that the
threshold x0(lN) that marks the upper limit of a range where
JlN (x) is negligible increases along with the order lN . For
N = 8 and R = 1.75λ, only l = 0, l = 1 and l = 2 contribute
to A in (27). As N increases, x0(lN) also increases. When
x0(N) becomes larger than 2kR, JlN (x) ≈ 0, for l > 0, in
the range x ∈ (0, 2kR]. In this case, A in (27) is approximated
by
A ≈ pic0
N−1∑
n=0
J20 (kRWn). (28)
For fixed R, the asymptotic behavior of A with N can
be analyzed through (28). As N increases, Wn = 2 sin( nN pi)
takes more samples of sinx in the range of x ∈ (0, pi], thus
J20 (kRWn) takes more samples of J
2
0 (x) in the range x ∈
(0, 2kR]. Because J20 (x) is non-negative, the more samples
are taken, the larger the summation of A is. However, when
N is not very large, (28) is not valid and there does not exist
a simple monotonic relationship between A and N .
The lower plot in Fig. 4 depicts the true value and the
approximation of A versus N for R = 1.75λ. In the lower
region of N , besides J0(kRWn), JlN (kRWn), l > 0, still
contributes to the summation of A, leading to the fluctuating
behavior. After N ≥ 19, the summation of JlN (kRWn), l > 0,
becomes less significant and the approximation in (28) is very
close to the true value. After N > 25, the asymptotic behavior
of A is almost linearly increasing with N . Due to the positive
correlation between p and A, p increases linearly with N when
N is very large and fluctuates in the low region of N .
B. Impact of Radius
The impact of R can be analyzed from (27) without any
approximation. For n = 1, ..., N−1 and l ≥ 0, the envelopes of
JlN (kRWn) decreases and approaches 0 as R increases. Thus,
the summation of A also decreases and approaches a certain
value as R increases. Due to the difference in the converging
speed of JlN (kRWn), there will be some fluctuations.
Examples of J0(kRWn) versus R for different n are
depicted in the upper plot in Fig. 5. Except for n = 0 when
W0 = 0 and J0(0) = 1, J0(kRWn) graduately decreases as R
increases. In the lower plot in Fig. 5, A versus R is shown for
N = 8. It can be seen that A, i.e., p, decreases in general with
fluctuations. However, in the low region of R, e.g., R < 2λ,
the decreasing behavior is not very obvious.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper presented the closed-form expression of the
SSOP for a UCA to analyze the security level of the ER-
based beamforming. To this end, the concept of the ER and
the SSOP were introduced for the free-space channel. Then, the
double-summation of the Bessel functions of the first kind was
obtained and simplified into the closed-form expression that is
subject to asymptotic analysis. As the number of elements in
a UCA grows larger, there is a linear relationship between the
SSOP and the number of elements, whereas in the low region
of the number of elements, the SSOP fluctuates. As the radius
of a UCA increases, the SSOP gradually decreases with some
fluctuations. For future work, the concept of the ER and the
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Fig. 5. Upper plot: J0(kRWn) versus R for different n, N = 8; lower
plot: A versus R, N = 8, θB = 0◦.
SSOP as well as the analysis of the array parameters can be
extended to a Rician channel.
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